I am honored to have had Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) Study 7 chosen as the subject of a Registered Replication Report (RRR), and would like to thank everyone involved for the time and effort that they have invested in exploring the relationship between intuition and cooperation. I was glad to see that the RRR replicated the results reported in our original paper. Beyond replicability, however, the lack of effect when including non-compliant participants in the RRR does raise important questions about the existence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation: the results are ambiguous on this point, as they are consistent with both a selection effect (no causal effect) and a meaningful positive causal effect.
Reflections on the Time-Pressure Cooperation Registered Replication Report
David G. Rand I am honored to have had Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) Study 7 chosen as the subject of a Registered Replication Report (RRR), and would like to thank everyone involved for the time and effort that they have invested in exploring the relationship between intuition and cooperation. I was glad to see that the RRR replicated the results reported in our original paper. Beyond replicability, however, the lack of effect when including non-compliant participants in the RRR does raise important questions about the existence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation: the results are ambiguous on this point, as they are consistent with both a selection effect (no causal effect) and a meaningful positive causal effect.
Here I present two analyses which, although not conclusive, provide support for the existence of a causal effect in the RRR data: one showing lack of selection bias based on the observed individual difference covariates, and another based on the pattern of cross-lab variation in the impact of excluding non-compliant participants. Taking the RRR results (and the analyses I present here) together with the findings of a recent meta-analysis with over 15,000 observations and no indications of publication bias (Rand, 2016) , I believe that the overall body of empirical evidence supports the general conclusion of the original 2012 paper (and subsequent theorizing based on the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, e.g. Bear and Rand (2016) ; Rand et al. (2014) ) that deliberation undermines cooperation in 1-shot anonymous interactions, while also showing the limitations of time pressure as an approach for investigating this question. I hope the results of this RRR, and the questions that they raise, will inspire future work to more fully illuminate the impact of time pressureand intuition more broadlyon human cooperative behavior.
Successful direct replication of our original finding
The main analysis in our paper excluded decisions by non-compliant participants, those who took longer than 10s in the time pressure condition or less than 10s in the time delay conditionin line with common practice for time pressure experiments in both psychology and economics (e.g. Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011); Kocher, Pahlke, and Trautmann (2011); Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) ; Sutter, Kocher, and Straub (2003); Young, Goodie, Hall, and Wu (2012) , as well as the papers whose null results partly motivated this RRR, Tinghög et al. (2013) and Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014) ).
When analyzed using this same exclusion criterion, the RRR data yielded a similar result to the original paper: both found substantial (and significant) positive effects of time pressure on cooperationeffects that did not significantly differ from each other, z = .73, p = .46. Thus, the RRR results successfully replicated our original published finding.
Intent-to-treat results are consistent with either selection bias or a causal effect of time pressure
The RRR's primary planned analysis was not the one conducted in the original paper. The alternative approach employed by the RRR was an "intent to treat" (ITT) analysis that compared all participants assigned to the two conditions, regardless of whether they complied with the timing manipulation. ITT analyses allow clear causal inference by avoiding selection biases. However, they also necessarily underestimate the actual effectiveness of treatments that do have a causal effect (because the ITT analysis includes untreated participants). This is especially true when a large fraction of participants were not successfully treatedas in the RRR, where 66% of participants in the time pressure condition failed to comply with the manipulation. While the RRR's ITT analysis found essentially zero effect of time pressure on cooperation, an ITT analysis combining data from the two time pressure studies in the original paper (an analysis not performed in the original paper) indicates a positive effect of 6.0 percentage points with a 95% CI of [1.1, 10.9].
Critically, although the RRR data do not provide evidence of a causal effect, they also do not rule out such an effect: given the low compliance rate, the 95% CI for the RRR's ITT estimate includes a true causal effect of up to 5.45 percentage points. 1 There may therefore be a true effect in the population, but the ITT effect in the RRR sample underestimated it (i.e. the ITT null result is not precisely estimated because of low compliance): the difference between the RRR result and the original might be due to sampling error coupled with a high rate of non-compliance.
Another way that the RRR data could be consistent with a positive causal effect of time pressure on cooperation was suggested in the RRR discussion: that non-compliant subjects in the RRR actually received a negative treatment (rather than simply being untreated). In that case, the negative effect for non-compliant participants would offset the positive effect of the treatment for compliant participants, resulting in no ITT effect overall despite a true treatment effect reflected in the compliant-only analysis.
A possible source of such negative treatment comes from a difference in design between the original studies and the RRR, namely the RRR's introduction (at my suggestion) of timers on the decision screen. While I suggested the timers in the hope of increasing compliance relative to the originala hope that was clearly not fulfilled, given that the RRR compliance rate was roughly half that of the original studyin retrospect the timers may have introduced a confound by making it clear to the non-compliant participants that they had failed to respond in time, while still allowing them to subsequently make (or change) their choice.
This may have made those participants (i) think their choice did not matter since the time had expired, leading to random play, 2 (ii) confused or surprised because the page did not autoadvance and still allowed them to change their choice, triggering the deliberation that time pressure was supposed to suppress, and/or (iii) feel annoyed or frustrated with the experimenter for demanding that they respond more quickly than they were able. Any of these effects could have led non-compliant participants in the time pressure condition not just to be untreated, but in fact to have received a cooperation-reducing treatment. 3 I recognize that these concerns regarding the timers are post-hoc, and more work is needed to compare the effect on cooperation of time pressure implemented with and without timers.
1 If the 65.9% of untreated subjects produced a zero effect, then the observed ITT effect size would be only 34.1% of the true effect size. Taking the upper bound of the ITT 95% CI, 1.86, and dividing by .341 gives the upper bound estimate of the true effect 95% CI as 5.45 percentage points. 2 Because the average cooperation rate was about 50% in most labs, increasing randomness (i.e. shifting cooperation towards 50%) would lead to a decrease in cooperativeness. 3 It is not possible to evaluate these hypotheses using the RRR data because for many participants, Qualtrics only recorded time taken to submit the final decision and not the times associated with first and last click pre-submission click (which prevents one from checking if non-compliant participants changed their decision after seeing the time expire). Rand (2016) The RRR's observations regarding time pressure are in line with a recent meta-analysis (Rand, 2016) of various cognitive processing manipulations (which, importantly, showed no signs of publication bias using Egger's test for small-study effects or p-curve). This metaanalysis found an overall strong positive effect of promoting intuition on cooperation in social dilemmas where defection is strictly payoff-maximizing (as in the RRR and Rand et al. (2012) ), even when conducting an ITT analysissupporting the conclusions of the original (Rand et al., 2012) paper. Regarding time pressure manipulations specifically, however, the meta-analysis (like the RRR) only found a positive effect when excluding non-compliant participants (see Figure 1 ). 4 This was in contrast to the other manipulations, which had much higher compliance rates and continued to show a strong positive effect of intuition when including non-compliant participants in an ITT analysis. 5 (Note that this observation regarding the limitations of time pressure based on my meta-analysis was pre-registered.) Rand (2016) and the RRR. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
RRR fits well with the meta-analysis of

Figure 1. Effect of increasing use of intuition (relative to deliberation) on social dilemma cooperation in experiments meta-analyzed in
What to conclude about the effect of time pressure based on the existing data, therefore, depends on the consequences of excluding non-compliant participants. Does this exclusion provide a better estimate of the true effect of time pressure, by focusing the analysis only on 4 Evidence in support of the existence of a true time pressure effect, at least in some populations using certain designs, comes from looking only at those time pressure studies run by my lab (15 studies, total unique N = 5,831) As reported in the personal meta-analysis of Rand et al. (2014) , this analysis avoided file-drawer effects by including all studies (published or unpublished), and avoided p-hacking by using the same simple comparison-ofmeans across all studies. The data showed a significant positive effect of time pressure both when excluding noncompliant participants and when performing an ITT analysis including non-compliant participants. 5 There continued to be no evidence of publication bias when considering only the non-time pressure studies; see Rand (2016) . participants who were effectively manipulated? Or does excluding non-compliant participants create the false appearance of a causal time pressure effect via bias induced by selection? I now present two analyses (designed and implemented after seeing the results of the RRR) which support the exclusion of non-compliant participants and speak against the existence of selection bias. Details of these analyses, as well as all code required to reproduce them, are presented in the Supplemental Material (SM): https://osf.io/efw7u/. The relevant SM section is indicated alongside each analysis.
Evidence against selection bias based on observed individual differences
One non-causal explanation for the treatment difference in the compliant-only analysis is selection bias based on individual differences: If people who complied differed from those who did not in attributes that influence cooperativeness, excluding non-compliant participants could artificially create a difference in cooperation across conditions. Based on this logic, an individual difference could potentially lead to selection bias if it is associated with both compliance and cooperation.
Accordingly, it is possible to test for selection bias based on the substantial number of individual difference measures that were collected in the RRR, many of which are theoretically linked to cooperation and thus are potential candidates for selection bias (e.g. trust, individualism/collectivism, prior experience with economic games, knowledge of the experimental hypothesis, comprehension of the payoff structure). Two of the collected measures did have robust (albeit small, r ~ .1) correlations with compliance, but neither was associated with increased cooperation: compliant participants were more likely to be male, but in fact men cooperated somewhat less than women; and compliant participants spent less time reading the instructions, which was unrelated to cooperation. See SM1.1 for details.
More generally, cooperation was related to many of the individual differences collected in the RRR (as expected, given that these measures were chosen in large part because of their hypothesized relationship with cooperation): regression models using all the individual difference measures to predict cooperation in the time pressure condition for each lab (allowing arbitrary non-linear functional forms for most measures) had an average r 2 = .94. If selection on any of these measures was responsible for the time pressure effect observed in the compliantonly analysis, then including them as covariates should reduce that effect. Yet this is not the case: predicting cooperation including all individual difference measures as covariates yielded a meta-analytic time pressure effect estimate of 11.8 percentage points, 95% CI [5.0, 18.6], which is actually slightly larger than the estimate from the analysis without covariates (10.3 percentage points, 95% CI [6.2, 14.4], as reported in the RRR). See SM1.2 for details.
Thus, there is no evidence that selection on any of the collected individual difference measures led to bias that inflated the time pressure estimate. Of course, these analyses can only speak to selection bias based on the covariates that were collected. It could still be the case that the compliant-only time pressure effect would be eliminated by covariates not measured in the RRR.
Evidence against selection bias based on an underlying decision time correlation
An alternative selection bias account argues that excluding non-compliant participants creates the illusion of a causal time pressure effect because of an underlying negative correlation between decision time and cooperation (Tinghög et al., 2013) . By this account, excluding noncompliant participants selectively excludes slow (and therefore selfish) participants from the time pressure condition and fast (and therefore cooperative) participants from the time delay conditionleading to higher cooperation in the post-exclusion time pressure condition. In other words, decision time is a proxy for cooperativeness, and exclusions based on compliance (i.e. decision time) are really just selection on cooperativeness.
Evidence against this selection bias account, and in support of a true causal effect, comes from considering the impact of exclusionthat is, how exclusion changes the magnitude of the time pressure effect. Specifically, theory and computer simulations (see SM2 for details) indicate that if there is a true causal effect and no selection bias, a positive relationship should be observed across labs between (i) the amount that the time pressure effect increases when excluding non-compliant participants (Δ exclusion ) 6 and (ii) the intent-to-treat time pressure effect when including all participants (TPall). In this "causal effect with no selection bias" scenario, excluding non-compliant participants gives an accurate measure of the true effect (by only considering people who were successfully treated), whereas the intent-to-treat effect TPall is a diluted representation of the true effect (because of non-compliance). Therefore, there should be a positive correlation between the size of intent-to-treat effect TPall and the difference between the compliant-only effect and the intent-to-treat effect Δexclusionbecause the intent-to-treat effect is just a diluted version of the compliant-only effect, a bigger intent-to-treat effect should be associated with an even bigger compliant-only effect. Put differently, if excluding non-compliant participants helps to refine a true effect by eliminating the many participants who were unsuccessfully treated (as opposed to inducing selection bias), there should be a positive relationship between TPall and Δexclusion because the exclusion amplifies the signal produced by the true causal effect (which is present but weaker in the intent-to-treat analysis of TPall).
Indeed, in the RRR data there was a positive relationship across labs between TPall and Δexclusion, r = .36. This is in stark contrast to what is observed when purposely introducing selection bias instead of excluding based on compliance: if one selectively excludes noncooperative participants from the time pressure condition, and cooperative participants from the time delay condition, this leads to a strong negative correlation across labs between TPall and Δexclusion, r = -.56. See Figure 2 , and SM3 for details and statistical analysis. 7 6 Δexclusion = TPexclusion -TPall, where TPexclusion is the time pressure effect when excluding non-compliant participants and TPall is the intent-to-treat time pressure effect when including all participants. 7 Bootstrapped p-values: difference between correlations for compliance-based and cooperation-based exclusions, p = .002; positive correlation for compliance-based exclusion, p = .057; negative correlation for cooperation-based exclusion, p = .007. Excluding data from the Srinivasan lab (whose reaction time data likely were corrupted, as RTs were longer in time pressure than forced delay): difference between the two correlations, p = .0003; compliancebased exclusion, r = .40, p = .046; cooperation-based exclusion, r = -.68, p = .002. Also, note that excluding participants at random from the RRR data leads to no correlation between TPall and Δexclusion, average r = .00. See SM3 for details.
Figure 2. Relationship between TP all and Δ exclusion in the RRR data when exclusions are made based on compliance with the time constraints (black) versus cooperativeness (gray). One point per lab. Least-squares fit lines added for visualization purposes.
These analyses make two points. First, the positive correlation between TPall and Δexclusion when excluding non-compliant participants is consistent with a true causal effect of time pressure with no selection bias. Second, the fact that excluding based directly on cooperation (instead of compliance) produces the opposite correlation shows that excluding based on compliance is not equivalent to selection bias based on cooperativenesscontradicting the deflationary account based on selection bias described at the beginning of this section.
Conclusion
In sum, the results of this RRR replicate our previously published findings, but are ambiguous regarding the existence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation because of a very high rate of non-compliance coupled with a null intent-to-treat effect. Nonetheless, the RRR data provide new insight into the functioning of time pressure experiments by allowing novel analyses that suggest excluding non-compliant participants may indeed help to reveal a true underlying time pressure effect (rather than introducing selection bias). When considered together, the extant data regarding cognitive process manipulations support the conclusion that intuition promotes cooperation in social dilemmas, consistent with the predictions of the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, while also emphasizing the limitations of time pressure (at least as implemented here) as a method for investigating this issue.
